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Abstract
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This paper uses detailed data on bound and applied 
tariffs to assess the consequences of the World Trade 
Organization’s December 2008 Modalities for tariffs 
levied and faced by developing countries, and the welfare 
implications of these reforms. The authors find that 
the tiered formula for agriculture would halve tariffs in 
industrial countries and lower them more modestly in 
developing countries. In non-agriculture, the formulas 
would reduce the tariff peaks facing developing countries 
and cut average industrial country tariffs by more than 
a third. The authors use a political-economy framework 
to assess the implications of flexibilities for the size of 
the tariff cuts and find they are likely to substantially 
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reduce the outcome. However, despite the flexibilities, 
there are likely to be worthwhile gains, with applied 
tariffs facing developing countries cut by about 20 
percent in agriculture and 27 percent in non-agriculture, 
and sizeable cuts in tariffs facing industrial countries. 
The welfare impacts of reform are evaluated using a 
new approach to aggregation that improves on the 
traditional, flawed approach of weighted-average tariffs. 
This substantially increases the estimated benefits of 
an agreement along the lines of these modalities, with 
estimated global income gains of up to $160 billion per 
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Implications of the Doha Market Access Proposals for Developing 
Countries 
 
Through the ten year history of the WTO‘s Doha Agenda, successive rounds of 
negotiations have moved through a framework for negotiations (WTO 2004), draft 
―modalities‖ of agreement (WTO 2006) and the detailed draft agreements on market 
access of December 2008 (WTO 2008a,b). The extensive consultations and negotiations 
leading to the Ministerial Meeting in April 2011 resulted in almost no change from the 
December 2008 agreements, and confirmed that the critical questions to be addressed 
were now political, rather than technical (WTO 2011), and hence no longer amenable to 
resolution through the continuing process of WTO negotiations. With major concern 
focused on the extent to which the proposed agreement would increase market access 
(Baldwin and Evenett 2011), it seems important to have a concise summary and 
assessment of the economic impacts of the particularly complex market access proposals 
on the table, whether as a basis for changes in approach that may lead to an agreement, or 
as part of the process of identifying a path forward for future negotiations (Schwab 2011). 
Despite, or perhaps because of, their detailed nature, it remains very difficult to 
assess the implications of these draft agreements for developing countries. While the 
draft agreement is based on line-by-line tariff cutting formulas, there is an enormous 
range of exceptions. This results in an important information asymmetry. It is relatively 
easy for countries to assess the ―pain‖ associated with the negotiations. They know the 
preferences and constraints on their policy makers, and have good information on their 
policies. Working out the ―gain‖ side of the deal is much more difficult. Even if policy 
makers in an individual country know what their trading partners are likely to do, they 
face a challenge in adding up the implications of these decisions. In this paper, we 
attempt to deal with these problems, to allow countries to assess the ―gain‖ as well as the 
―pain‖ associated with negotiating proposals.  
Some key questions include: What are the implications of the current formulas for 
tariffs levied by WTO members, and for the tariffs facing developing countries? What 
would happen if these formulas were adopted without exceptions? How are the benefits 
affected by the flexibilities in agriculture and non-agricultural market access (NAMA)?  
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Answers to these questions are clearly of critical importance if informed decisions are to 
be taken to move the overall process of negotiations forward.  
This analysis incorporates two methodological innovations not previously applied 
in assessments of draft Doha agreements. The first is systematic approach to the selection 
of exceptions from the tariff cutting rules, based on the political objective function 
proposed by Grossman and Helpman (1994) and applied in Jean, Laborde and Martin 
(2010b, 2011). The second is use of optimal aggregators of trade distortions when 
measuring the welfare impacts of reform (see Laborde, Martin and van der Mensbrugghe 
2011) to overcome the well-known problems with trade-weighted averages—that the 
higher the tariff, the lower the weight on any tariff, and that partial reforms generate 
benefits from increases in the volume of imports subject to continuing tariffs.   
The Doha Development Agenda is about much more than market access in 
agriculture and non-agricultural merchandise trade. We focus on these parts of the 
agreement because: (i) they appear to be much more important for welfare impacts than 
other quantifiable impacts such as agricultural domestic support or export competition; 
(ii) they are complex proposals, whose impact requires very careful evaluation, (iii) 
acceptance of something like these proposals is a necessary, but far from sufficient, 
condition for a broader agreement being reached; and (iv) our ability to make informed 
assessments on agricultural and NAMA market access is much greater than in areas such 
as services or trade facilitation.  
In this paper, we begin by examining the key market access features of the draft 
agreement. We first consider the impacts of the formulas on average tariffs, and then 
assess the implications of the flexibilities for different countries and commodities. 
Through most of the paper, we focus on the impacts on the well-understood weighted 
average tariff rates applied by, and facing, individual countries and groups of countries. 
Then, in the final section of the paper, we consider the impacts of these reforms for real 
incomes.  
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Proposed Reforms in Agricultural and Non-Agricultural Merchandise Trade 
 
The December 2008 proposals on agriculture and non-agricultural trade reforms were 
negotiated separately, although it is widely recognized that the final outcomes in each 
negotiation will be linked. The important details are discussed below and the actual 
approach used in the empirical analysis summarized for reference in Table 2, which also 
provides key details such as the groups to which individual countries belong. 
 
Agricultural Market Access Modalities 
In agriculture, we based our analysis on the tiered formula, which provides for larger 
proportional cuts on higher tariff rates. The boundaries of the four tariff bands for 
developed and developing countries are given in Table 1, together with the proportional 
cuts to be made in bound agricultural tariffs in each band.  
 
Table 1. The tiered formula for agricultural tariff cuts 
  Developed  Developing 
Band  Tier, %  % Cut  Tier, %  % Cut 
A  0-20  50  0-30  33.3 
B  20-50  57  30-80  38 
C  50-75  64  80-130  42.7 
D  >75  70  >130  46.7 
Average cut  Min  54  Max  36 
 
The tiered formula requires that tariffs be available in ad valorem form. This 
involves an element of discretion in the case of agriculture because of the presence of 
tariff-rate-quotas (TRQs), for which the recorded price of imports may be inflated 
through inclusion of quota rents, thus resulting in underestimates of the true ad valorem 
equivalent. A consistent method for evaluation of ad valorem equivalents has been 
agreed (Annex A to WTO, 2006) and this methodology is used in assessing the bands in 
which tariffs are placed, and hence the tariff cuts required.  
As is evident from Table 1, the tariff cutting formula is quite aggressive, 
particularly relative to the approach used in the Uruguay Round negotiations. In the 
Uruguay Round, countries were required to meet a target only in terms of the average-cut  
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in their tariffs, a procedure which encouraged them to make larger cuts in their smaller 
tariffs. The Doha tariff-cutting formulas have the economically desirable feature of 
making larger cuts in the higher—and hence more costly—tariffs.
1 In line with long-
standing practice, developing country cuts in each band are two-thirds those of the 
industrial countries. The bands are also wider, in part to allow for the fact that many 
developing countries would otherwise have more tariffs included in the higher bands. 
Special provisions apply for tariff escalation products. Here the general principle 
is that processed products subject to tariffs higher than their raw or intermediate forms 
are moved to the next higher tier. If they are in the highest tier, the cut is increased by 6 
percentage points. If the gap between the processed and unprocessed product is less than 
5 percentage points, then the tariff escalation procedure is not used, and the tariff on the 
processed product should not be brought below the tariff on intermediates.  
A list of ―tropical‖ and diversification products will be subject to deeper-than-
formula cuts. Two lists of products have been considered—one includes highly sensitive 
products such as rice, sugar and bananas (see Appendix G of the agricultural modalities), 
and another is the more limited list used in the Uruguay Round. Two alternative 
treatments have been discussed. Under the first, tariffs below 25 percent would be 
reduced to zero, and no sensitive product treatment permitted. Under the second, tariffs 
below 10 percent would be reduced to zero, while higher tariffs would be reduced by 70 
percent, except for products already in the top tier, which would be cut by 78 percent. 
Under the second alternative, sensitive product treatment will not be ruled out.  The 
Uruguay Round set, without sensitive products, is used in the empirical analysis.  
Several groups of developing countries listed in Table 2 are allowed smaller tariff 
reductions. Least Developed Countries (LDCs) are not required to make any reductions. 
Small and Vulnerable Economies (SVEs)
2 can make reductions 10 percent smaller in 
each band than other developing members, or may make an average-cut of 24 percent. 
Recently-acceded members (RAMs) are allowed to: make cuts reduced by 8 percentage 
points; make zero cuts in tariffs below 10 percent; to delay their reductions until a year 
                                                 
1 As conjectured by Falconer (2008) and shown by Jean, Laborde and Martin (2010a), the political costs, 
and hence the pressure for exceptions, may rise even more rapidly than the economic benefits.  
2 Defined in general as countries with less than 0.1 percent of world trade, with some countries such as 
Congo, Côte d‘Ivoire and Nigeria treated on the same basis in agriculture. See Table 2 for the country list.  
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after completion of their accession commitments; and have 1/10
th more special products 
with cuts 2 percentage points smaller. A group of very recently acceded members 
(VRAMs) and transition economies is not required to make any cuts.  
All countries are permitted to make smaller cuts on ―sensitive‖ products. The 
modalities include a limit on the number of sensitive products, and provisions for 
increases in market access under TRQs for sensitive products. In industrial countries 4 
percent of tariff lines can be classified as sensitive, except for countries with over 30 
percent of bindings in the top band, or with tariffs scheduled at the six digit level, in 
which case this percentage can be increased by 2 percentage points. If the formula cut is 
reduced by 2/3, then TRQ access must be increased by 4 percent of domestic 
consumption; if the reduction is by half, then the TRQ increase can be 1 percentage point 
less; if the reduction is by 1/3, then the TRQ increase is 0.5 percentage points less. 
Developing countries have the right to one third more sensitive products than developed 
countries. 
Developing countries will be able to self-designate a set of Special Products 
guided by indicators and to make smaller-than-formula cuts on these products. The 
number of these products is to be negotiated between 12 percent of agricultural tariff 
lines, of which up to 5 percent would be subject to no cuts with the remainder cut by an 
average of 11 percent.
3 Several countries have ―expressed reservations‖ on the number of 
special products and have requested more tariff lines. 
Sensitive products are likely to be selected from an agreed list of products 
nominated by any member—a process that means the list will not constrain the choice of 
products unless a country wishes to add a product after the list has been finalized. Special 
products are self-designated guided by a set of indicators. These indicators cover a range 
of issues such as importance as a staple food; the proportion of demand met from 
domestic production; importance in employment; the share of output processed; whether 
productivity is low in any part of the member relative to the world average. It seems 
likely that these indicators will allow countries considerable freedom to self-designate 
products.  
                                                 
3 RAMs are entitled to declare 13 percent of tariff lines as special products with an average cut of 10 
percent.  
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A key question in forming an ex ante assessment of the implications of these 
flexibilities for tariff reductions and market access is how the sensitive and special 
products will be chosen. Some studies have assumed that the products likely to be chosen 
for smaller or zero cuts would be those with the highest bound tariffs (Sharma 2006); 
while others have assumed that they would be those with the highest applied tariffs 
(Vanzetti and Peters 2008) and still others have used a tariff-revenue-loss criterion under 
which the products selected tend to be large imports subject to large cuts in applied tariffs 
(Jean, Laborde and Martin 2006). None of these approaches has any firm conceptual 
basis.  
Following Jean, Laborde and Martin (2010a, 2011) we use the Grossman-
Helpman (1994, equation 5) government preference function to identify the products 
whose treatment as sensitive would give the largest reduction in the political costs 
associated with tariff-cutting. Jean, Laborde and Martin (2011) show that this leads to 
selection of products with relatively large shares of total imports; high applied tariffs; and 
that would face large cuts in applied rates. They also show that the consequences of 
sensitive products selected on this basis are likely similar to those of their tariff-revenue 
loss rule—with even small numbers of sensitive products sharply reducing the cuts in 
average tariffs.  
The draft agreement to eliminate or sharply reduce the use of the Special 
Safeguard (SSG) which currently allows countries that converted non-tariff barriers into 
tariffs by ―tariffication‖ in the Uruguay Round (mostly developed countries) to impose 
duties above their Uruguay Round bindings. There is agreement to include a new Special 
Safeguard Mechanism (SSM) for developing countries with import duties triggered by 
increases in import volumes or declines in import prices. Hertel, Martin and Leister 
(2010) show that automatic application of the quantity-based SSM would increase the 
volatility of domestic prices, while the price-based measure would increase the volatility 
of world prices, but duties seem unlikely to be raised above bound levels very frequently. 
Because of uncertainty about its precise parameters and the extent to which the options to 
impose duties will be used, we have not included this measure in our analysis in this 
paper. 
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Non-Agricultural Market Access 
 
The draft modalities for NAMA (WTO 2008b) also involve a tariff formula with 
exceptions. The formula is applied on base rates equal to existing bound tariffs or to the 
average applied MFN rate in November 2001 plus 25 percent for currently unbound tariff 
lines. The tariff formula in this case is the highly nonlinear Swiss formula, which reduces 
the highest tariffs by the most. The Swiss formula requires tariffs in ad valorem terms, 
and all tariffs are to be converted into ad valorem terms and bound in those terms.  
 
The Swiss formula is: 












where t1 is the tariff after application of the formula; t0 is the tariff rate before application 
of the formula, and ai is a coefficient for group i.  
The coefficient ai in equation (1) would be 8 for industrial countries, with no 
flexibility for individual products. For developing countries, the coefficient is to be based 
on a sliding-scale with a coefficient of 20, 22 or 25 depending upon the extent of 
flexibility chosen. Countries choosing ai =20 could keep 6.5 percent of tariffs unbound or 
not cut these tariffs as long as they do not cover more than 7.5 percent of imports; or to 
make half-of-formula cuts in 14 percent of lines on products covering no more than 16 
percent of imports. With ai=22, 5/5 percent of lines/imports would be allowed no cuts, or 
up to 10/10 percent of lines/imports allowed half-of-formula cuts. With ai=25 no 
flexibilities would be available. 
Least-Developed-Countries (LDCs) are not required to use the Swiss Formula, 
but are expected to increase their binding coverage. Countries with binding coverage 
below 35 percent
4 are exempt from formula cuts but required to bind—at an average 
tariff of 30 percent or lower—75 percent of tariffs if their binding coverage is currently 
below 15 percent, or 80 percent otherwise. 
Small and vulnerable economies (SVEs) face different disciplines. Those with 
average bound tariffs of 50 percent or higher must bind at an average not exceeding 30 
                                                 
4 These are frequently called Paragraph 6 countries because of the paragraph in the 2004 Framework 
Agreement that introduced this provision.  
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percent. Those with an average bound tariff between 30 and 50 percent must bind at 27 
percent or less. Those with average bound tariffs between 20 and 30 percent are to bind at 
an average of 18 percent or less. Those with an average bound tariff below 20 percent 
must bind at an average rate equal to that arising from a 5 percent cut in 95 percent of 
tariff lines.  
RAMs receive a grace period of 3 years and an extended implementation period 
of 3 years. In contrast with the case of agriculture, they do not receive smaller cuts in 
tariffs. However, very recent acceded members benefit from tariff reduction exemption. 
The NAMA proposal includes provision for sectoral initiatives, for which participation is 
not mandatory, but agreement is to be reached when 90 percent of world trade is included. 
In most cases, it is proposed to move to zero tariffs on these products. 
 
Specifying Cuts in Tariffs 
 
To provide a preliminary assessment of the implications of the modalities for the applied 
protection, we use the MAcMapHS6 version 2.1 database (Boumellassa, Laborde and 
Mitaritonna, 2009) for 2004 together with a set of bound tariff rates for which ad valorem 
equivalents have been calculated on the same basis. We first cut the bound tariff rates 
using the approaches considered in the modalities, and then assess their implications for 
applied rates. Where the draft agreements involve a range, we generally use the mid-point. 
The specific choices of parameters used are set out in Table 2. In this analysis, we use the 
conventional assumption that applied rates are not reduced unless the new bound rate 
falls below the baseline applied rate
5, assumed to be the applied rate in the tariff baseline 
which is which is for 2004 - MAcMapHS6 v2.1 dataset – with several key updates. We 
take into account for some internationally-binding commitments to reform that will affect 
the tariffs that would have applied in 2025 in the absence of an agreement. The 
adjustments to the baseline tariff include WTO commitments taken in the accession 
process by a range of countries, including China and Ukraine. In addition, the Japanese 
GSP for LDCs has been updated based on 2007 improvements in terms of product 
                                                 
5 This assumption neglects the important value that can arise from bindings above current applied rates, but 
ruling out incidents of higher tariffs in the future (Francois and Martin 2004).  
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coverage. Due to its importance, the effects of EU sugar reform on EU applied tariffs are 
also included in the baseline (Bureau and Gohin, 2007). 
The tariff reduction formulas and the flexibilities are intertwined in that countries 
are frequently willing to consider more ambitious formulas when they have the flexibility 
to make smaller cuts for some products (see Jean, Laborde and Martin 2011). A major 
problem for negotiators in this situation is that the ―price‖ paid for the flexibilities—in 
terms of efficiency and market access—is difficult to evaluate. We make a distinction 
between the cuts without flexibility and those resulting from the formula plus flexibility 
to allow an estimate of the implications of the flexibilities, as long as it is recognized that 
agreement on the particular formulas was almost certainly contingent on the presence of 
flexibilities.  
In some cases, such as NAMA reforms in the industrial countries, the formula can 
simply be applied to the bound tariffs using the coefficients in Table 2. In most cases, 
however, it was necessary to take account of the flexibility options before the cuts to 
applied rates could be determined. In many other cases, the selection of products to be 
accorded flexibility was a multi-stage process. For agriculture, we assumed that 
developing countries would use special products—with their smaller tariff cut 
requirements—for the products with the strongest political support; then sensitive 
products
6. In the NAMA flexibilities, it was necessary to examine the full range of 
choices available before the regime involving the least political cost could be identified.  
 
   
                                                 
6 With a priority for the category of sensitive products with a 25% deviation and no TRQ creation.  
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Table 2. Summary of key elements of the tariff cuts used in the analysis 
  Developed  Developing  LDCs  SVEs  Para 6 
NAMA           
Formula  Swiss 8  20 (i): Swiss 20 & 0 cuts on 6.5%/7.5% of 
lines/imports; 20 (ii): Swiss 20 & ½ cuts on 
14/16% of lines/ imports; 22 (i): Swiss 22 & 
no cuts on 5/5% of lines/imports; 22 (ii) 
Swiss 22 & ½ cuts on 10/10% of 














of tariffs at 
an average 
≤ 30% 
Flexibility  None 
Unbound  MFN 2001 + 25 %       
 
Agriculture  Developed  Developing      RAMs 
Bands  0/20/50/75  0/30/80/130  no libn  no libn   
Proportional cut  50/57/64/70  33.3/38/42.7/46.7      Tiered 
formula with 
cuts 8% pts 
smaller 
  
Scaled proportionately if the average-cut (including sensitive, 
tropical & tariff escalation products) <54% in industrial 
countries; if > 36% in developing 
Sensitive 
products 
4% of lines   5.3% of lines       
If >30% in top tier, 2% pts more       
Special products    14% lines; 40% no cut & 60% with 
15% cut  
     
Tariff Escalation 
Products 
Cut from next higher tier applied. In top tier add 6 percentage 
points to the cut 
     
Tropical products  t ≤ 10, Cut to zero; 10 <t≤ 75, 70% cut; t>75, 78%       
Cotton  Cut to zero on imports from LDCs       
         
Notes: Members self-select developing or developed country status. Members likely selecting developed-country status include 
the 27 members of the European Union, plus Australia, Canada, Iceland, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland and the United 
States of America. The Republic of Korea is a developing country for agriculture; a developed country for NAMA. LDCs are 
identified in the UN list of Least Developed Countries. Economies treated as Small and Vulnerable (SVE) for NAMA were: 
Antigua & Barbuda, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Botswana, Brunei Darussalam, Cameroon, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican 
Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Fiji, Gabon, Georgia, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, 
Macau, Mauritius, Mongolia, Namibia, Nicaragua, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, 
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Sri Lanka, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay and Zimbabwe. For SVE treatment in Agriculture, 
add Congo, Côte d‘Ivoire, Nigeria. Paragraph 6 economies (those with less than 35% of tariffs bound) were identified as 
Cameroon; Congo, Cuba, Ghana, Kenya, Macau, China; Mauritius; Nigeria; Sri Lanka; Suriname; Zimbabwe. Members treated 
as RAMs are: China, Croatia, Ecuador, Georgia (NAMA only) Jordan, Mongolia, Oman, Panama, and Chinese Taipei.  Members 
treated as VRAMs (no cuts) in agriculture are. Albania, Armenia, Georgia, Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia, Saudi Arabia, Tonga, Ukraine, Vietnam.  The Special Product percentages used are higher than in the 
December 2008 modalities because of the ―serious objections‖ of some developing countries.. 
 
In agriculture, we could not explicitly represent the TRQ increases which are 
associated with sensitive product designation in the industrial countries. We anticipate 
that most users of TRQs will use the option to reduce the formula cut by two-thirds and 
expand quotas by 4 percent of domestic consumption. In light of the finding by de Gorter 
and Kliauga (2006, p155) that TRQ expansion would have about one-third the impact of 
tariff cuts, we treated sensitive products as reducing the formula tariff cut by one-third.   
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The NAMA flexibility regime for each developing country was selected from the 
options listed in Table 2 using techniques detailed in Jean, Laborde and Martin (2010b). 
The Grossman-Helpman political costs associated with each of the five available regimes 
was evaluated subject to the constraints identified in Table 2. The lowest-political-cost 
option chosen is shown in Table 3 for each of the 22 developing countries using the 
Swiss formula, with estimates of the initial and final bound tariffs for these countries. An 
interesting feature is the wide range of likely choices of regime. For members with low 
and uniform tariffs – such as Chile; Hong Kong SAR, China; and Singapore – a choice of 
the highest coefficient with no flexibilities is likely to yield the lowest political ―pain‖. 
For countries with higher and less uniform applied tariffs, the choice is less obvious. 
Using our methodology, which takes into account the value of trade and the squared 
reduction in the price of each good, we find that twelve countries are likely to opt for the 
lowest coefficient, 20. Of these, most would likely choose half-formula cuts on no more 
than 14 percent of tariff lines and 16 percent of trade. An additional seven members opt 
for a coefficient of 22, with all but one of these electing for no cuts on up to 5 percent of 
tariff lines and 5 percent of trade.  
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    %  % 
Argentina  22 (i)  31.5  15.0 
Brazil  22 (i)  29.9  14.0 
Chile  25  25.0  12.4 
Colombia  22 (i)  35.2  14.7 
Costa Rica  22 (i)  33.8  12.3 
Egypt  20 (i)  24.7  11.7 
Hong Kong SAR, China  25   11.2  5.5 
India  22 (ii)  32.2  13.3 
Indonesia  22 (i)  35.1  14.2 
Israel  20 (ii)  16.8  8.0 
Malaysia  20 (ii)  12.5  7.7 
Mexico  22 (i)  35.1  14.7 
Morocco  20 (i)  40.2  15.5 
Peru  20 (i)  30.0  12.5 
Philippines  20 (i)  15.3  7.1 
Singapore  25  9.1  5.0 
Thailand  20 (i)  23.3  11.4 
FYR Macedonia.  20 (ii)  11.0  11.0 
Tunisia  20 (i)  42.6  16.1 
Turkey  20 (ii)  20.6  10.3 
United Arab Emirates  20 (i)  13.9  8.8 
Venezuela  22 (i)  33.1  14.3 
Note: See Table 2 and the text for the Swiss formula coefficient and flexibility regimes. 
 
Implications for Average Applied Tariffs 
 
In this section, we consider the implications of the formulas and scenarios discussed 
above for weighted-average tariffs levied and faced by developed and developing 
countries under the agricultural and non-agricultural proposals. As shown by Anderson 
and Neary (2007) and evaluated for agricultural sensitive products in Jean, Laborde and 
Martin (2011), this standard measure of tariff reduction is incomplete as a measure of 
market access, and of economic welfare. However, it provides an initial, and widely 
understood, initial indication of the potential economic effects—something that is not  
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obtainable through reliance only on changes in bound tariff rates. We first consider the 
tariffs levied by countries, and then the tariffs they face on their exports.  
A key question for negotiators is the extent to which the tariff-cutting rules and 
exceptions affect the size of the tariff cuts they must undertake—which are strongly 
related to the political ―pain‖ associated with the negotiations—and the reductions in the 
barriers they face abroad—which help determine the political ―gain‖ associated with the 
negotiations. For agriculture, these two aspects of the negotiations are summarized for 
two key groups: (i) the high-income countries, and (ii) developing countries, other than 
LDCs, for whom the required tariff cuts are set to zero—in Figures 1(a) and 1(b). For 
non-agricultural products, similar estimates are provided in Figures 1(c) and 1(c). In these 
graphs, we use the widely-cited percentage cut in the tariff from its initial level—a useful 
measure of the progress towards open trade achieved under the negotiations. More details 
to help identify the sources of these outcomes, and the critically important results for 
individual countries, are given in the appendix.  
Figure 1(a) shows that the tariff formulas in the draft agreement would—without 
any flexibility—result in more than a 50 percent cut in the agricultural tariffs levied by 
the developed countries. For developing countries, the resulting cut would be much 
smaller, at 18.5 percent. The large difference reflects two key influences, the smaller cuts 
in developing country bound tariffs, and the larger gaps between bound and applied rates 
(binding overhang) in many developing countries that reduce the extent to which cuts in 
bound tariffs reduce applied rates. The inclusion of flexibilities reduces the cuts in 
applied rates in the industrial countries, but still leaves a substantial cut in the average 
applied rate in the high-income countries. In the developing countries, by contrast, the 
inclusion of flexibilities reduces the cut in average applied rates to 0.8 percent of the 
initial tariff rate. Clearly, the fact that cuts in applied rates in developing countries are 
lower than in the industrial countries is primarily due to the differences in the formula 
and binding overhang, rather than to flexibilities, but the flexibilities reduce the impact 
further.  
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Figure 1: Percentage cuts in applied tariffs 
(a) in average agricultural tariffs levied 
 
(b) in average agricultural tariffs faced 
 
   
(c) in average NAMA tariffs levied 
 
(d) in average NAMA tariffs faced 
 
Source: Authors computation. 
 
When we turn to the agricultural tariffs faced in Figure 1(b), we see that the cuts 
in average applied tariffs faced would be enormous in the absence of flexibilities—close 
to 40 percent for the industrial countries, and close to 45 percent for developing countries. 
For both groups of countries, these benefits are more than halved by including the 
flexibilities. However, for both groups of countries, the result is a substantial overall cut 
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18.5 percent of their initial level, while those facing developing countries are cut by 19.6 
percent of their initial level. 
For non-agricultural products, the proposed Swiss formula cuts NAMA tariffs by 
an average of 38 percent in the industrial countries, and 25 percent in developing 
countries (Figure 1(d)). Because the industrial countries have no flexibilities, tariffs in 
these countries are cut by the full 38 percent. After considering the flexibilities, the cut in 
average NAMA tariffs in developing countries is 13 percent. Turning to the tariffs faced 
measure in Figure 1(d), we see that, without flexibilities, the tariffs facing industrial 
countries would fall by 30 percent while, with flexibilities, the resulting cut would be 20 
percent. For developing countries, the formulas would result in a cut of 27.6 percent in 
average tariffs faced, and this cut shrinks to 17.2 percent once the flexibilities are taken 
into account. However, the outcomes for individual countries differ considerably, as is 
evident from the more detailed tables in the Appendix.  
 
Welfare Impacts of Reform 
 
In assessing the welfare impacts of reform, we take into account both the efficiency gains 
resulting from changes in the volumes of goods transacted across trade (and domestic) 
distortions, and the terms-of-trade changes that result from reforms by all participants. A 
key innovation in studies of the Doha Agenda is our use of an optimal aggregation 
approach originally developed by Bach and Martin (2001) for individual countries and 
extended to global models by Anderson (2009). As shown by Laborde, Martin and van 
der Mensbrugghe (2011), this approach deals with two inherent problems of the usual 
fixed-weighted-average approach to tariff aggregation: (i) the progressive increases in the 
quantity weights on products being liberalized within each product group, and (ii) the 
omission, in partial liberalization scenarios, of increases in tariff revenues resulting from 
increases in import volumes of goods being partially liberalized. For expenditures on 
imported goods, and hence the determination of import quantities, we use an optimal 
expenditure aggregator. For tariff revenues, we use a weighted-average with the quantity 
weights adjusting in response to changes in the relative prices of different imported goods.   
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An important step in implementing this approach is to obtain an estimate of the 
extent to which imports of products at the finest level of aggregation respond to changes 
in prices resulting from tariff reduction. No measures of the exact elasticities we require 
appear to be available, but the available estimates of closely-related parameters allow us 
to identify a broad range of between two and five for the elasticity of substitution 
between products defined at the six-digit level used in the construction of our estimates 
(see Laborde, Martin and van der Mensbrugghe 2011 for a discussion).  
The analysis was undertaken using the LINKAGE model for comparability at the 
level of aggregation used in Anderson, Martin and van der Mensbrugghe (2006). The 
estimated real income gains associated with liberalization were first estimated using the 
traditional estimation procedure based on weighted-average tariffs. These estimates were 
then compared with results using optimally-weighted estimates of distortions obtained 
using an elasticity of substitution of two. The implications of the Doha simulations were 
also investigated using an elasticity of substitution of five. The results for these scenarios 
are presented in Table 4. 
Table 4 contains many interesting results about the implications of the 
negotiations for welfare. A first is that the formulas used in the negotiations—without 
exceptions – would potentially result in substantial real income gains. With the weighted 
average tariff measures, the gains from applying the tariff reduction formulas for 
agriculture and non-agriculture would result in gains roughly one-third as large as those 
from full liberalization. For low and middle-income countries as a group, the gains would 
be a larger share of the total potential gains—a little over 40 percent. When the 
flexibilities are introduced, the benefits to the world as a whole decline sharply, from 
$163 billion to $93 billion in this case. The estimated gains to developing countries 
decline by more than half, to $22 billion.  
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Table 4. Welfare implications of Doha Liberalization, $bn 
   Total Libn    Doha Formula Cuts   Doha with flexibility  
   Wtd Ave  σ =2 
Wtd 
Ave  σ =2   σ =5 
Wtd 
Ave  σ =2   σ=5 
Australia/N Zealand  16.1  16.8  4.4  4.8  6.0  1.9  2.4  3.6 
EFTA  20  31.6  6.1  7.6  9.5  3.0  4.2  6.2 
EU 27  135.3  180.4  45.4  58.7  81.2  29.6  39.3  52.9 
United States  47.9  53.8  11.2  14.5  18.5  6.4  9.9  14.1 
Canada  7.3  8.6  1.2  1.5  2.3  0.2  0.8  1.7 
Japan  52  64.9  25.6  29.2  32.4  18.4  21.8  26.1 
Korea and Taiwan, 
China  77.1  98.7  19.6  21.2  23.0  9.3  9.8  10.5 
Hong Kong SAR, China 
& Singapore  28.7  29.2  3.1  3.1  2.8  2.5  2.5  2.5 
Chile  2.2  2.1  0.5  0.4  0.3  0.2  0.2  0.2 
Bangladesh  -0.5  0.2  -0.8  -0.2  0.0  -0.4  -0.2  -0.3 
Brazil  21.7  30.8  7.4  9.8  15.8  4.2  4.7  6.0 
China  -21.4  -8.6  6.3  9.7  20.9  5.7  8.9  13.9 
Egypt  1.2  10  0.3  0.5  0.8  0.2  0.4  0.6 
India  18.9  24.3  5.4  6.1  7.2  2.5  2.4  2.4 
Nigeria  3  6.8  2.0  2.9  4.1  -0.1  -0.1  -0.1 
Pakistan  4.1  4.6  0.7  0.9  1.3  0.1  0.1  0.1 
Indonesia  2.8  3.9  1.3  1.5  3.8  1.0  1.0  1.0 
Thailand  6.6  8.7  3.7  4.5  5.7  1.8  2.6  4.2 
Mexico  5.7  10.1  4.1  4.7  5.5  3.7  4.7  5.8 
SACU  3.8  14.1  1.2  1.4  1.9  0.7  1.3  2.2 
Turkey  8.2  11.3  1.5  1.6  1.7  0.4  0.5  0.6 
Rest of Asia  6.8  24.5  2.4  2.9  7.3  -1.6  -1.2  -0.3 
Rest of LAC  11.8  18.5  4.9  6.4  7.6  2.2  2.5  2.8 
Rest of the World  26.4  64.3  2.2  3.8  4.9  1.4  1.9  2.5 
Morocco and Tunisia  3.5  6.1  1.8  2.4  3.2  0.9  1.6  2.7 
Rest of Sub Saharan Afr  6.4  9.4  1.7  2.3  3.1  -0.6  -0.6  -0.6 
High income countries  384.4  484  116.6  140.6  175.6  71.3  90.7  117.6 
WTO developing ctries  217.2  369.1  69.2  85.8  120.9  34.0  42.9  56.7 
Low & middle inc. ctries  111.4  241.2  46.5  61.5  95.1  22.2  30.7  43.7 
L. America & Caribbean  41.5  61.6  16.9  21.3  29.2  10.4  12.1  14.8 
Sub Saharan Africa  13.2  30.4  4.8  6.6  9.0  0.1  0.6  1.5 
World total  495.8  725.2  163.1  202.1  270.7  93.5  121.4  161.3 
Source: LINKAGE model simulations relative to the 2025 world economy 
The estimated welfare gains from a Doha scenario obtained when using the 
traditional trade-weighted average tariffs are somewhat difficult to compare with other 
studies because of the nature of the experiments conducted, improvements in the baseline  
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tariffs, and other reasons outlined in van der Mensbrugghe (2006). However, once 
attention turns to reasonably comparable experiments and models, the results do seem to 
be reasonably comparable. Bouët and Laborde (2010) use the MIRAGE model to consider 
a very similar liberalization scenario for agricultural and non-agricultural trade and 
estimate real income gains in the same year (2025) of $69 billion, as against the $93.5 
billion reported above. The two main contributing factors to the differences between 
these results are the lower elasticities of substitution between domestic and imported 
goods in MIRAGE and, in the case of agriculture, the greater ability to reallocate land 
among agriculture uses in the LINKAGE model. Anderson, Martin and van der 
Mensbrugghe (2006, p370) consider different experiments, with slightly deeper cuts in 
agricultural tariffs but only a stylized 50 percent cut in nonagricultural tariffs. Their 
estimated impact of $96 billion without exceptions is smaller than the $163 billion 
reported above, but this is presented in 2001 dollars and relative to a 2015 world 
economy that was only around three quarters of the size of the 2025 economy used in our 
analysis. 
Another recent study of the Doha Agenda by Hufbauer, Schott and Wong (2010, 
p11) estimates a gain of $63 billion in 2010 dollars for the ―on the table‖ proposals 
(including flexibilities) for liberalization of agriculture and non-agriculture. This result is 
broadly comparable with our estimate of $93 billion in 2025, an outcome that reflects two 
offsetting differences in methodology. On one hand, the Hufbauer, Schott and Wong 
study uses a partial-equilibrium modeling framework that would typically result in lower 
estimates than a comparable general-equilibrium analysis. On the other hand, it uses a 
highest-tariff-rule for selection of sensitive products that reduces the estimated adverse 
impacts of the flexibilities in agriculture (Jean, Laborde and Martin 2011). 
When we address the aggregation problem, the welfare gains from liberalization 
rise. With an elasticity of substitution of two, the welfare gains from full liberalization 
rise by 50 percent to $725 billion per year. The gains from application of the formula 
without exceptions rise by a quarter, from $163 billion to $202 billion. The gains to 
developing countries rise by roughly a third, from $46.5 billion to $61.5 billion. When we 
turn to an elasticity of substitution of five, the gains to the high income countries are  
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roughly 50 percent above their estimate using the weighted average methodology. For 
developing countries, they are more than twice as high, at $95.1 billion per year. 
When we consider Doha liberalization with exceptions, the gains decline 
considerably relative to the application of the formulas without exceptions. This is most 
striking when using the weighted average approach where the global gains fall to $93.5 
billion per year, and the gains to developing countries to $22 billion. When the 
aggregation problems are addressed using an elasticity of substitution of two, the gains to 
the world rise to $121.4 billion and the gains to developing countries rise from $22 
billion to $30.7 billion. Moving to an elasticity of substitution of five, the global gains 
rise to $161 billion, with a little over a quarter of these gains ($43.7 billion) accruing to 




In this initial assessment, we first considered the features of the current draft modalities. 
On the basis of our reading of these texts, and predictions of the likely implications of 
flexibilities, we assessed the consequences for applied tariffs. Finally, we considered the 
implications of reform for economic welfare. 
When considering the tariffs levied by individual countries, we found that the 
formulas discussed in the modalities would—in the absence of flexibilities— result in 
substantial reductions in applied tariffs in the industrial countries. In agriculture, the 
reduction in WTO developed country tariffs would be by a factor of two, from 15.4 
percent to 7.0 percent. While they may be needed to secure an agreement, the sensitive 
product provisions appear to result in a substantially smaller cut in these tariffs, and result 
in a final tariff of 10.4 percent. In NAMA, initial average tariffs in the industrial countries 
are low, although they include peak tariffs on products of particular interest to developing 
countries. The formula results in a cut from 1.7 percent to 1.0 percent, with no 
flexibilities allowed. 
In developing countries, the cut in applied agricultural tariffs implied by the 
formula is much smaller, with the average falling from 13.7 percent to 11.2. When 
flexibilities for particular country groups and for Special and sensitive products are  
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included, the average post-cut tariff is 13.6 percent. NAMA tariffs decline from 4.8 
percent to 3.6 percent when the formula is applied without flexibilities. When flexibilities 
are factored in, the cut is from 4.8 percent to 4.2 percent.  
In terms of tariffs faced, most countries would appear to see significant reductions 
in the agricultural tariffs they face if the formulas were implemented without exceptions. 
Worldwide, the average agricultural tariff would fall from 14.6 percent to 9.2 percent. 
Allowing for exceptions increases the final tariff to 12.1 percent. Most of this increase is 
accounted for by the sensitive product flexibilities for industrial countries, rather than by 
the more comprehensive flexibilities allowed to developing countries—these flexibilities 
have more impact because they are implemented in a context of deeper formula cuts. 
Most countries see reasonably significant changes in the tariffs they face, with the 
smallest reductions in countries such as LDCs that benefit from preferences in the 
industrial countries, and see small tariff reductions in their developing country partners. 
Therefore, the initiative within the Doha Agenda to provide Duty-Free and Quota Free 
market access is potentially quite important as a means to deliver real market access gains 
for these countries.  
In NAMA, the average tariff levels are considerably lower. If the formulas were 
implemented without exceptions, most countries would see substantial reductions in the 
tariffs they face, with the world-wide average tariff falling from 2.9 percent to 2.0. In this 
case, flexibilities are confined to developing countries, and result in the final tariff 
increasing from 2.1 to 2.4 percent. A number of developing countries, such as Pakistan 
and Sri Lanka face much larger initial tariffs and experience much larger gains.  
Considering agriculture and non-agriculture together, the applied tariffs facing 
developing countries would fall by around 36 percent—from 3.8 percent-- if the formulas 
were implemented without exceptions. The final tariff rises to 2.9 percent once 
flexibilities are introduced, for an overall reduction of 24 percent. The gain to the 
industrial countries is broadly similar. These final percentage reductions in applied rates 
are in the same order of magnitude as the 36 percent reductions sought in tariff bindings 
during the Uruguay Round but are of potentially greater impact because they are 
associated with reductions in tariff peaks and in the uncertainty about market access 
opportunities not measured in these averages. The key question is whether these gains in  
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market access will be sufficient to outweigh the political pain associated with reductions 
in countries‘ own protection. 
We estimate that the potential global welfare gains from an agreement using the 
tariff-reduction formulas under discussion would be roughly a third of those from full 
liberalization. These gains are very sharply reduced—to under a fifth of the total potential 
gains-- once the exceptions to the formulas are introduced. The reduction associated with 
the flexibilities is particularly marked for the developing countries, whose gains decline 
to only $22 billion per year. When we take account of the aggregation problem that has 
lead to under-estimation of the welfare gains in earlier studies of this type, the welfare 
gains from all liberalization scenarios rise substantially. The global gains from Doha-type 
reform—even with exceptions—rise to $160 billion per year with the most price-
responsive case considered. The gains to developing countries increase particularly 
strongly, from $22 billion to $44 billion per year.  
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Appendix 
Details of the Tariff Cuts in the Analysis 
In this appendix, we consider the implications of the tariff formulas for the weighted-





In Table A.1, we see that the formulas applied without exceptions (Formula) 
would result in a decline from 14.6 to 9 percent in average applied agricultural tariffs 
worldwide. In the WTO developed countries, the result is a cut of over 50 percent in 
applied rates, from 15.4 to 7.0 percent. In WTO developing countries other than the 
LDCs, the reduction is from 13.7 percent to 11.2 percent, a cut which is smaller than in 
the industrial countries partly because of key features of the formula—the smaller cuts 
and higher tier boundaries laid out in Table 1—and greater binding overhang in many 
developing countries. 
Without exceptions, the cut in the EU 27 applied agricultural tariff is from 15.9 to 
6.6 percent—a cut of almost sixty percent of its initial value. In the United States, the 
corresponding cut is from 4.8 to 2.1 percent—a reduction of 56 percent from its initial 
value. The cut in Japan‘s average applied agricultural tariff is almost 16 percentage points, 
from 29.8 percent to 14 percent—a reduction of over 50 percent from its initial level. The 
impact of the basic developing country formula on applied rates differs considerably 
depending upon the initial level of binding overhang. In India, the formula would reduce 
average tariffs by almost 8 percent of their initial level while, in China, the reduction 
would be from 7.8 percent to 5.3, a cut of 32 percent.  By contrast, in many former 
GATT Contracting Parties, such as Brazil and Nigeria, binding overhang means that the 
full formula, without exceptions, would result in very small cuts in average applied rates.  
The flexibilities for countries and commodities included in the Flex scenario more than 
halve the worldwide cut in tariffs, from 5.6 percent under the Formula to 2.7 percent. 
Interestingly, it is in the high-income countries that the tariff cut is reduced the most—
with the tariff-cut after flexibilities declining from 8 percentage points to 4.4 percentage  
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points. In low and middle income, non LDCs, the flexibilities reduce the cut from 2 
percent to 0.1 percentage points, suggesting that developing countries made much smaller 
political-economy gains from the debate about flexibilities than the industrial countries 
The differences in the definitions of country groups between the World Bank and the 
WTO have some noticeable implications. In particular, the high-income countries as 
defined by the WTO have larger tariff cuts than those self-classified as developed in the 
WTO, because some high-income countries, such as Korea, choose developing country 
status in order to reduce the cuts in their tariffs.  
Looking at the results for NAMA in Table A.2, the cut in world average tariffs if 
the formulas were applied without exceptions
7 is from 2.9 to 2.0 percent. In the high 
income countries, the reduction is from 1.6 percent to 1.0 percent. In non LDC low and 
middle income countries, the reduction is estimated to be from 6.1 percent to 4.6 percent, 
a cut of four-tenths of the original tariff. In some developing countries, such as 
Bangladesh,
8 Pakistan and Thailand application of the formula alone would appear to 
result in substantial cuts in average tariffs. When we consider the group of countries that 
would apply the standard developing country formula—that is a group excluding LDCs, 
RAMs and SVEs- the reduction in tariffs is from 3.9 to 3.1 percent, a cut of 0.8 
percentage points.  
Implementing the exceptions is found to reduce the size of the cut for developing 
countries as a group by 0.3 percentage points, as well as to allow countries the flexibility 
to choose a pattern of tariffs more consistent with their policy preferences. 
   
                                                 
7 Under this no-flexibilities scenario, coefficient z is chosen for all developing countries. 
8 In this scenario, no DFQF initiative for LDCs is considered  
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Table A.1. Average tariffs levied on WTO agricultural products by scenario, %. 
   Regions  Scenarios 
  Base  Formula  Flex 
Australia NZ  2.5  1.5  1.9 
Bangladesh  16.4  16.4  16.4 
Brazil  4.8  4.7  4.8 
Canada  10.7  5.1  8.6 
Chile  1.7  1.7  1.7 
China  7.8  5.3  7.5 
Egypt   15.7  14.8  15.7 
EU-27  15.9  6.6  10.2 
HK & Singapore  0.2  0.2  0.2 
India  59.2  54.6  59.2 
Indonesia  7.6  7.0  7.6 
Japan  29.8  14.0  20.4 
Korea, Rep. of and Taiwan, China  27.8  18.5  27.1 
M. East & North Africa  36.9  30.4  36.5 
Mexico  3.9  3.3  3.9 
Nigeria  24.0  24.0  24.0 
Pakistan  20.9  20.7  20.9 
Rest of Europe  37.4  19.5  28.2 
Rest of LAC  9.8  9.4  9.8 
Rest of South East Asia  16.1  12.3  16.0 
South Africa  5.9  5.3  5.9 
Sub-Saharan Africa  13.3  12.8  13.3 
Thailand  20.6  15.3  19.6 
Turkey  13.6  10.9  13.2 
United States of America  4.8  2.1  3.0 
  World Bank Classification       
All countries  14.6  9.0  11.9 
Low &Middle income countries (non LDC)  13.3  11.3  13.2 
High income countries  15.5  7.5  11.1 
WTO Classification       
Developed WTO  15.4  7.0  10.4 
Developing WTO non LDCs  13.7  11.2  13.6 
LDCs  12.5  12.2  12.5 
Normal Developing WTO  15.1  12.3  15.0 
RAM WTO  13.4  12.8  13.4 
SVE WTO  10.7  7.8  10.5 
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Table A.2. Average tariffs levied on WTO non-agricultural products by scenario, % 
Regions  Scenarios 
  Base  Formula  Flex 
Australia NZ  3.6  2.4  2.4 
Bangladesh  18.3  12.5  18.3 
Brazil  8.5  7.4  7.8 
Canada  0.9  0.5  0.5 
Chile  1.9  1.9  1.9 
China  5.6  3.9  4.4 
Egypt   8.2  6.3  7.6 
EU-27  1.8  1.0  1.0 
HK & Singapore  0.0  0.0  0.0 
India  12.9  11.7  12.0 
Indonesia  3.9  3.5  3.9 
Japan  1.3  0.7  0.7 
Korea, Rep. of and Taiwan, China  4.0  2.8  3.1 
M. East & North Africa  16.2  9.3  9.9 
Mexico  3.0  2.5  2.5 
Nigeria  21.4  13.0  21.4 
Pakistan  15.3  11.0  15.3 
Rest of Europe  0.2  0.1  0.1 
Rest of Latin America  7.6  6.5  6.9 
Rest of South East Asia  5.7  3.6  5.4 
South Africa  4.6  3.2  4.2 
Sub-Saharan Africa  9.9  7.5  9.9 
Thailand  8.1  5.4  6.7 
Turkey  1.0  0.6  0.7 
United States of America  1.5  0.8  0.8 
World Bank Classification 
      All countries  2.9  2.0  2.3 
Low &Middle income countries (non-LDC)  6.1  4.6  5.3 
High income countries  1.6  1.0  1.0 
WTO Classification 
      Developed WTO  1.7  1.0  1.0 
Developing WTO non LDCs  4.8  3.6  4.2 
LDCs  10.9  8.0  10.9 
Normal Developing WTO  3.9  3.1  3.4 
RAM WTO  9.5  7.1  9.5 
SVE WTO  5.3  3.9  4.4  
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Tariffs Faced 
 
Tables A.3 and A.4 show some quite substantial reductions in the tariffs facing WTO 
members. Table A.3 shows that the average tariff facing agricultural exporters would 
decline by more than one-third—from 14.6 to 9.0 percent—through application of the 
formula without exceptions (Formula). The reduction in the tariff facing industrial 
countries is quite similar to that facing developing countries—5.8 percentage points in 
the former and 5.7 in the latter. Even in the LDCs, for whom preference erosion 
diminishes the gains from market access, the average tariff barrier faced falls from 7.4 
percent to 6.5 percent. Under this scenario, the RAMs and SVEs would benefit from 
particularly large reductions in the unusually high tariff barriers they face. In some 
specific cases, such as Australia, Brazil, China, Pakistan and Thailand the benefits from 
reductions in tariffs faced would be even larger. For Thailand, the reduction in 
agricultural tariffs faced would be over 10 percentage points.  
In Scenario Flex, where flexibilities are incorporated, the reductions in tariffs are 
much smaller, with the reduction in global agricultural tariffs declining from a potential 
5.6 under the Formula alone to 2.7 percentage points. Part of this reduction in the tariff 
cut comes from the sensitive and Special Product flexibilities used by developing 
countries.. The ―pain‖ in terms of lost market access is spread between the industrial and 
developing countries, with the average tariff facing both the high income countries and 
developing countries rising by 2.9 percentage points. 
In NAMA, the average barrier falls from 2.9 percent to 2.0 percent for the world 
as a whole when the formulas are implemented without exceptions. For the high income 
countries, this reduction is 0.9 percentage points, from 3.0 to 2.1 percent, while the 
reduction for non LDC developing countries as a group is 1 percent. For LDCs, which 
face tariff peaks despite preferences, the reduction in the tariff they face is larger, at 1.3 
percentage points. Pakistan benefits from a particularly large reduction in the average 
tariff it faces from 6.5 percent to 3.8 percent. 
Partly because the industrial countries have no flexibilities, and partly because the 
flexibilities for developing countries are subject to meaningful disciplines, the 
flexibilities in NAMA do less damage to market access than in the case of agriculture.  
    31 
For the high-income countries, the tariff after application of the formula increases from 
2.2 percent to 2.4 percent, but remains far below its original 3.0 percent. For developing 
countries, the corresponding increase is from 1.9 percent to 2.1 percent, which remains 
well below its initial level of 2.9 percent.  
The cuts facing particular countries sometimes change in very different ways. 
While the reductions in the average NAMA tariff facing the United States are modest—at 
0.3 percentage points or 17 percent of the initial tariff faced—this is not primarily 
because of the flexibilities. Even without the flexibilities, the cut was only 0.4 percentage 
points. This suggests that the cuts are small largely because of the prevalence of low 
tariffs, which are subject to smaller cuts under the Swiss formula. For Bangladesh, which 
faces some very high tariffs on products such as clothing, by contrast, the average tariff 
faced is cut by more than half its initial level even after allowing for the flexibilities.  
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Table A.3. Average tariffs facing exports of agricultural products, % 
Regions  Scenarios 
  Base  Formula  Flex 
Australia NZ  17.3  10.2  13.9 
Bangladesh  14.7  12.6  14.4 
Brazil  18.8  9.8  13.7 
Canada  9.0  5.2  6.8 
Chile  8.7  5.2  6.4 
China  16.8  9.7  13.8 
Egypt   8.0  5.6  6.7 
EU-27  16.6  10.6  13.6 
HK & Singapore  18.4  12.7  17.2 
India  10.1  7.2  8.9 
Indonesia  21.5  19.4  20.4 
Japan  14.0  9.9  12.7 
Korea, Rep. of and Taiwan, China  16.0  10.8  12.8 
M. East & North Africa  16.3  8.6  10.7 
Mexico  4.2  2.3  3.1 
Nigeria  2.6  2.4  2.5 
Pakistan  13.2  8.5  11.8 
Rest of Europe  20.4  11.9  15.9 
Rest of LAC  13.4  6.7  10.1 
Rest of South East Asia  15.2  11.7  13.9 
South Africa  15.5  9.7  12.5 
Sub-Saharan Africa  6.6  4.5  6.1 
Thailand  23.7  13.3  19.2 
Turkey  9.1  5.7  7.1 
United States of America  14.0  8.5  11.3 
World Bank Classification 
      All countries  14.6  9.0  11.9 
Low &Middle inc. countries (non LDC)  14.3  8.6  11.5 
High income countries  15.1  9.3  12.3 
LDCs  7.4  6.5  7.1 
WTO Classification 
      Developed WTO  15.0  9.2  12.1 
Developing WTO non LDCs  14.4  8.8  11.7 
Normal Developing WTO  13.9  9.0  11.3 
RAM WTO  11.8  5.9  9.7 
SVE WTO  18.5  10.3  15.0 
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Table A.4. Average tariffs facing exporters of non-agricultural goods, % 
Regions  Scenarios 
  Base  Formula  Flex 
Australia NZ  2.9  2.0  2.6 
Bangladesh  3.7  1.7  1.8 
Brazil  2.6  1.9  2.2 
Canada  0.4  0.3  0.3 
Chile  1.7  1.4  1.5 
China  3.8  2.3  2.5 
Egypt   2.7  2.0  2.1 
EU-27  3.6  2.7  3.0 
HK & Singapore  3.7  2.5  2.8 
India  4.6  3.1  3.6 
Indonesia  3.4  2.2  2.5 
Japan  4.5  3.0  3.5 
Korea, Rep. of and Taiwan, China  3.8  2.6  2.9 
M.E. & North Africa  1.2  0.8  1.1 
Mexico  0.3  0.3  0.3 
Nigeria  1.4  1.4  1.4 
Pakistan  6.5  3.8  4.2 
Rest of Europe  1.2  1.0  1.0 
Rest of Latin America  2.6  1.9  2.0 
Rest of South East Asia  2.4  1.4  1.5 
South Africa  2.9  2.3  2.7 
Sub-Saharan Africa  2.1  1.4  2.0 
Thailand  3.4  2.2  2.5 
Turkey  2.1  1.3  1.5 
United States of America  1.8  1.4  1.5 
World Bank Classification 
      All countries  2.9  2.0  2.3 
Low & Middle inc. countries (non LDC)  2.9  1.9  2.1 
High income countries  3.0  2.1  2.4 
WTO Classification 
      Developed WTO  2.9  2.1  2.4 
Developing WTO non LDCs  3.0  2.0  2.2 
LDCs  2.8  1.5  1.8 
Normal Developing WTO  2.4  1.7  1.9 
RAM WTO  3.4  2.1  2.4 
SVE WTO  3.6  2.3  2.5 
 